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Abstract 
 
This study investigates the effect of disclosure of information regarding school quality on the 
stratification of elementary schools and the widening disparity in the academic ability of students 
between schools. Using the event in which school-level test scores were first disclosed in October 
2014 in Matsue City in Japan, I estimated the change of the effect of test scores on housing rents and 
population in a school district before and after disclosure. I found that school-level test scores had a 
significantly positive effect on housing rents of apartments intended for a family after the scores 
were disclosed. I also found that disclosure significantly increased the population of elementary 
school-aged individuals within the attendance district of school with high test scores. Additionally, I 
found that the relative standard deviation of test scores after disclosure became larger than that 
measured before disclosure. These results suggest that disparity in the academic ability of students 
between schools may expand through increased housing rents after disclosure of school-level test 
results. 
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1. Introduction 
In recent years, accountability has been introduced by many public institutions for the purpose of 
efficient operation and improving performance, and the disclosure of information regarind the 
quality of service is progressing. With disclosure of information on quality, suppliers will operate 
more responsibly, and demanders will be able to make better decisions. In the field of education, the 
disclosure of school quality information may change the educational behavior of parents or improve 
students’ academic performance. Koning and van der Wiel (2013) found that disclosure of negative 
information related to quality of a school decreased the number of first-year students in the 
Netherlands who chose that school after disclosure. Hastings and Weinstein (2008) demonstrated 
that the fraction of parents who chose higher-performing schools significantly increased with receipt 
of information on school quality. Burgess, Wilson, and Worth (2013) found significant and robust 
evidence indicating that the abolition of school performance tables markedly reduced school 
effectiveness in Wales relative to England.   
In Japan, despite concerns over excessive competition and expansion of disparities among schools, 
national academic achievement tests for elementary and junior high school (compulsory education) 
students were not conducted until 2007. Furthermore, only the average scores of prefectures on the 
national test were disclosed until 2014 (Kawaguchi, 2011). Under such circumstances, since 2000, 
several educational problems such as a decline in children’s academic performance, inequality of 
education, and expansion of child poverty have been discussed in Japan (Kariya et al., 2002; Abe, 
2008), and the introduction of a national test and disclosure of its results were strongly requested for 
efficient operation and improved performance. As a result, the national test known as the National 
Assessment of Academic Ability (NAAA) has been conducted since 2007, and since 2014 schools’ 
average test scores have been disclosed in several municipalities.  
In this study, I used the unique event of disclosure of school quality information, which had not 
occurred until 2014, and investigated how it affected students’ academic performance and parental 
educational behavior. However, because there is no difference in fees associated with public 
education among schools in Japan, parents’ educational demand is not reflected in school fees and it 
is difficult to directly observe their educational investment behavior and willingness to pay for their 
children’s schooling. Therefore, I focused on the housing market in areas where a school district 
system existed to indirectly observe the effect of the disclosure of school quality information on the 
behavior of parents. 
There have been many studies investigating the effect of school quality on real estate prices, and 
consistent results have been obtained indicating that "school quality has a significantly positive 
effect on housing or land prices" (Black & Machin, 2011; Nguyen-Hoang & Yinger, 2011). The 
mechanism is as follows: If a school district system exists, in order to attend a specific school it is 
necessary to live within its attendance district; thus, the demand for housing or land within the 
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attendance district of high quality schools rises, and as a result, the price of housing and land within 
the attendance district also become high. Specifically, the value that parents place on education is 
capitalized as housing or land prices. However, there have not been many studies investigating the 
effect of the disclosure of school quality information on the housing market compared to studies 
focusing on the relationship between school quality and the housing market. Particularly, few studies 
have tried to determine whether competition and disparities among schools occurs as a result of 
disclosure, and therefore the effect of disclosure on them must be examined. Additionally, from the 
policy evaluation perspective, because the educational system and environment greatly differ from 
country to country, it is also important to investigate what happened after disclosure of school 
quality information using Japanese data.. 
  In this study, using the event that the school-level test scores were first disclosed in October 2014 
in Matsue City in Japan, I estimated the effect of disclosure on housing rents and population in the 
school district. To avoid the problem of unobserved confounding factors, I controlled the area fixed 
effect and the various trends of the region. I also investigated how disparity in academic 
achievement among schools changed after disclosure. As a result, I found that school-level test score 
had a significantly positive effect on rents of apartments intended for a family after the school-level 
test scores were disclosed. I also found that the disclosure effect was significant only in areas with 
many children, and was insignificant in areas with few children. Additionally, my results suggest that 
disclosure significantly increased the population of elementary school-aged individuals within the 
attendance district of schools with high test scores. These results indicate that parents choose 
residential areas in response to new information regarding school quality, and that the housing 
market is also affected. Finally, I also found that the value which indicated the degree of disparity 
(i.e., relative standard deviation of test scores) became large as a result of disclosure.  
These results suggest that disparity in the academic ability of students between schools may 
expand through increased housing rents after disclosure of school-level test results. The potential 
mechanisms are as follows: The disclosure of information on school quality makes parents exercise 
more selective behavior for their children, and as a result, the amount of money they need to pay to 
attend good schools increases, reflecting growing demand for good education. Additionally, parents' 
school choice behavior is heterogeneous, and parents with a higher educational background and 
income, or with more enthusiasm for their children's education, tend to choose higher quality schools. 
In contrast, parents with a relatively low educational background and income, or with less 
willingness to pay for their children's education, are crowded out of good school districts through 
increased housing rentals, and sorting of students occurs. As a result, potentially talented students 
(who have parents with good educational backgrounds, higher incomes, or enthusiasm for education) 
gather at high quality schools, and therefore disparity in academic achievement between schools will 
expand. 
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  Relative to previous studies, this study makes several contributions to the literature. First, by using 
housing prices instead of land prices, I was able to estimate and interpret the effect of school quality 
on the property market more clearly because the rental housing data included indices on whether the 
properties were intended for families. Second, previous studies mainly imply the possibility of 
selective disclosure by real estate agencies; however, by using not only housing data but also 
population census data for small areas organized by age group, my results indicate that there is 
evidence that the residential choice of parents is also changing due to disclosure of school quality 
information. Third, I was able to clearly measure the effect of disclosure of public school quality 
information on a regional community by focusing on a city where a school district system clearly 
existed and few private schools were present. Finally, although academic performance, school choice, 
and the property market were estimated in each previous study, in this investigation I consider the 
effect of disclosure on all three categories. 
The structure of this paper is as follows: Section 2 reviews the previous literature and explains the 
contributions of this study. Section 3 describes the empirical strategies used. Section 4 discusses the 
data and setting of the study. Section 5 presents the results and discussion. Finally, Section 6 
provides concluding remarks. 
 
 
2. Literature review 
Many studies have considered the effects of school quality on housing rents, and Black and 
Machin (2011) and Nguyen-Hoang and Yinger (2011) offer comprehensive reviews of this literature. 
These studies have shown consistent results, indicating that school quality has a significant positive 
effect on the price of housing or land (e.g., Black, 1999; Figlio & Lucas, 2004). In Japan, Ushijima 
and Yoshida (2009) and Kuroda (2018) also found that increasing school quality increased property 
price significantly. Ushijima and Yoshida (2009) found that school quality affected land prices only 
in areas with high-quality schools, and the results of Kuroda’s investigation (2018) indicated that 
school quality had a greater effect on rents of apartments with larger occupied areas. These results 
suggest that there is heterogeneity among families or properties affected by school quality. 
 Studies investigating the effect of disclosure of school quality information can be roughly 
classified as focusing on the following categories, depending on the type of outcome variable: 
academic achievement, school choice, and property price. Koning and van der Wiel (2012) 
investigated the effect of disclosure of school quality information on academic performance. They 
found that disclosure of information on the relative quality of schools in the national newspaper 
improved performance in a group of schools with relatively lower performance scores. Conversely, 
Burgess, Wilson, and Worth (2013) investigated whether the abolition of disclosure of school 
performance information negatively affected school effectiveness. They found significant and robust 
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evidence suggesting that abolition of school performance tables markedly reduced school 
effectiveness, but that it did not affect schools in the top quartile of the league tables. The results of 
these studies indicated that disclosure of school quality information had an effect on academic 
performance, but that the effect might have heterogeneity among schools depending on quality. 
There have also been studies on the effect of disclosure of school quality information on 
choice of school. Koning and van der Wiel (2013) found that the number of enrollments for 
schools with lower scores decreased after disclosure of information about the quality of high 
schools in the Netherlands. They also found that these effects were large for the most 
academically rigorous path, such as the college-preparatory track. Nunes, Reis, and Seabra 
(2015) found that disclosure of school ranking based on the national academic exam decreased 
the number of enrollments in schools that were rated poorly and increased the probability that 
they would be closed. They also observed that these effects were stronger for private schools. 
Hastings and Weinstein (2008) examined both a natural experiment and a field experiment in 
which direct information on school test scores was provided to lower-income families in a 
setting involving a public school choice plan, and they found that receiving information 
significantly increased the fraction of parents who chose higher-performing schools. Their 
results also indicated that attending a higher-scoring school increased student test scores, thus 
implying that school choice would effectively increase academic achievement for disadvantaged 
students when parents could access school quality information. According to these results, 
parents and children referred to school quality information when choosing their school if they 
could access the information; therefore, high-quality schools attracted a large number of 
enrollments. Conversely, the number of enrollments at low-quality schools decreased. 
Additionally, because of the heterogeneity among schools and parents, children and parents that 
were more interested in education cared more about school quality; thus, high-quality schools 
might be attractive to students with high motivation or ability. Consequently, disparity in 
academic achievement among schools might expand due to disclosure of school quality 
information. 
  Recently, there have been several studies on the effect of disclosure of school quality information 
on the price of housing or land. Imberman and Lovenheim (2016) studied the effect of disclosure of 
value-added information regarding school quality. Their results suggest that parents and homeowners 
do not value the ability of schools and teachers to increase test scores, nor are they unaware of the 
importance of value-added information because the measures are derived from a complicated 
statistical model that is difficult for non-experts to understand. Carrillo, Cellini, and Green (2013) 
found evidence indicating that real estate agents selectively disclosed information on school 
assignments. They also found no significant effects of disclosure on home prices and observed point 
estimates very close to zero by controlling for school quality with elementary school fixed effects. 
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They reasoned that school quality information might be obtained by buyers before disclosure 
because of the growth of the Internet and the increasing availability of data. Haisken-DeNew et al.’s 
(2018) study examined the effect of launching a website providing standardized information about 
school quality to the Australian public. They found that favorable information on schools increased 
real estate prices, but bad information did not have a significant effect, and even controlling for 
school quality, this result is significant. They interpreted these results as indicative of buyers being 
unaware of the importance of school quality information and real estate agents conducting strategic 
and selective disclosure (i.e., disclosing information on good schools and not disclosing information 
on bad ones) to raise selling price. 
In short, previous studies have found consistent results suggesting that disclosure of school quality 
information has a positive effect on academic performance in low-quality schools and increases the 
number of enrollments in schools with good quality. The former effect can reduce disparity between 
schools, while the latter can expand it. Due to heterogeneity among schools and parents, children and 
parents that are more interested in education care more about school quality; therefore, high-quality 
schools may be attractive to students with high motivation or ability. Thus, through disclosure, the 
scores of schools that originally had higher scores increased, while the scores of schools that 
originally had lower ones decreased. As a result, disparity between schools might expand. 
However, there is no consistent evidence as to whether the real estate market accurately reflects of 
disclosure of information on school quality. If property prices within good school districts increase 
as a result of disclosure of information on school quality, parents have to pay more money to send 
their children high-quality schools. Therefore, high quality schools attract parents that have high 
income and high educational backgrounds, and disparity among schools may increase due to parents’ 
income and educational background strongly correlating with their children's academic ability. 
Relative to the previous research discussed above, this study makes several contributions to the 
literature. First, by using housing prices instead of land prices, I was able to estimate and interpret 
the effect of test scores on the property market more clearly because rental housing data included 
indices regarding whether the properties were intended for families. I was also able to show that 
there were no events besides disclosure of school quality information that affected the property 
market by analyzing properties intended for single people and rental shops/offices that were thought 
insignificant in relation to school quality. 
  Second, I was able to demonstrate that the population of school-aged children changed as a result 
of disclosure, by using not only housing data but also population census data by age group of small 
areas. Previous studies have mainly suggested that housing rents will increase in high quality school 
districts due to selective disclosure by real estate agencies. However, in this study, I was able to 
show that disclosure of school quality information affected not only housing rents but also 
population. This suggests that the rise in housing rental reflects actual parents’ demands for their 
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children's education. 
Third, I was able to clearly measure the effect of disclosure of public school quality information 
by focusing on a city where a school district system clearly existed and few private schools were 
present. Schwartz, Voicu, and Horn (2014) and Fack and Grenet (2010) suggest that the relationship 
between school quality and real estate price becomes weak when schools can be freely chosen 
irrespective of school district. Thus, if there are many ways to receive education besides public 
schools, the effects of school quality or disclosure might not be measured accurately. However, in 
Matsue City, which I analyzed, these problems were solved since most ways of receiving primary 
education are limited to public schools. Additionally, there are no entrance exams in Japanese public 
elementary and junior high schools; thus, the importance of residential choice is high. 
  Finally, I examined not only the effect of disclosure on the property market and population, but 
also on disparity between schools. In previous research, academic performance, school choice, and 
the property market have been evaluated, but in this study, I consider the effect of disclosure on all 
three categories. By doing so, I can suggest the possibility of the existence of the following 
mechanism: The disclosure of school quality information promotes parents’ residential choice 
behavior, which is reflected in the real estate market, and as a result, disparity between schools will 
expand. Although I cannot refer to each causal relation, it is important from a policy evaluation 
perspective to suggest the possibility that disparity will expand due to disclosure. 
 
 
3. Empirical strategies 
3.1. Housing rents 
I estimated the effect of test scores on housing rents and the change in the effect due to 
information disclosure using hedonic regression. Since parents did not have a way of obtaining 
official information regarding school quality before disclosure, and they were able to access that 
information after disclosure for the first time, so the effects of the test score (which was an index of 
school quality) on housing rents would change before and after disclosure. Therefore, I regressed the 
interaction term of the test score and “after-disclosure dummy" on housing rentals with various 
control variables included. The basic estimation equation was as follows: 
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 ∙ 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖 + 𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖 + 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
where 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 was the rent of apartment 𝑖𝑖 in area 𝑗𝑗 in attendance district 𝑎𝑎 in quarter 𝑇𝑇. 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 
was the test score of the school located in attendance district 𝑎𝑎, and was to be used as a proxy 
variable of the school's quality, which was converted into the deviation value and the rank of the 
school within the area from raw data. 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 was the after-disclosure dummy taking one after 
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disclosure of school-level test scores1, or indicating the days elapsed from the date of disclosure. The 
vector 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 included characteristics of the apartments in question, such as occupied area and the age 
of the building. 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖 was a quarter dummy and 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖 was an area dummy to control time and area fixed 
effect respectively 2 . 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  contained the area characteristics that changed over time (such as 
population and average age). 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  also controlled for specific trends in the central urban and 
suburban areas3, as well as the north and south areas4. 
 In the above estimation equation, 𝛽𝛽2 represented the effect of the test scores on housing rents 
before disclosure of school-level test scores, and 𝛽𝛽1 represented the effect of test scores on housing 
rents after disclosure. If parents considered the test scores as representative of school quality, and if 
they could not know that information before the disclosure of school-level test scores, there was no 
significant relationship between the test scores and housing rents before disclosure, and there should 
have been a significant relationship between the test scores and housing rents only after disclosure5. 
As Carrillo, Cellini, and Green (2013) suggest, we must note that parents could obtain school quality 
information from not only official disclosure, but also other data source such as local communities 
and networks. Therefore, school quality was capitalized to a certain extent by housing rent before 
disclosure, but the impact of the first official disclosure of information was still large, and it might 
have had the effect of raising the rent, as well. 
Additionally, I used the intersection terms of each quarter dummy and school rank to analyze 
changes in effect over time. I used the following estimation equation: 
ln𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼 + � 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖20
𝑖𝑖=2
+ 𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖 + 𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖 + 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
where 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 represented the impact of school quality on housing rents for each quarter 𝑇𝑇. In this study, 
I performed my analysis using 20 quarterly (5 yearly) data, and information on school quality was 
disclosed between the 12th and 13th quarters. Therefore, with the first quarter (𝑇𝑇 = 1) as the baseline, 
if school quality became capitalized related to housing rents due to disclosure, 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖  indicated 
significance when 𝑇𝑇 ≥ 12. Conversely, if there was no significant relationship between school 
quality and housing rents before disclosure, 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖  indicated insignificance when 𝑇𝑇 < 12. I also 
analyzed whether the effect of disclosure on housing rents was short-term or long-term. Additionally, 
                                                  
1 Specifically, this dummy variable took one after October 23, 2014. 
2 I used quarter dummies instead of year dummies because the real estate market experiences seasonality. 
I also analyzed data using month dummies, and the results were consistent. 
3  The definitions of central urban and suburban were based on the "Matsue City Central Area 
Revitalization Basic Plan" published by Matsue City. 
4 Matsue City is divided into northern and southern areas by a large river, and each has different 
characteristics. The southern area is downtown and has a central station, and the northern area is a 
residential one where a university and castle ruins exist. 
5 Since the planned disclosure of school-level test scores was announced in local news, etc. for several 
months prior to the disclosure date, it was likely that many people knew about the disclosure at that time. 
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by confirming the significance of 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 before the 12th quarter, we could also verify whether the 
parallel trend assumption was satisfied. 
 
3.2. Number of posted apartments 
  There was concern that the property data that I used in this study came from data posted on real 
estate information websites and did not indicate actual transactions. If cheap property was posted at a 
specific time and area, or a high-class condominium with large capacity was built during the analysis 
period, the average regarding property rentals might have been affected greatly. Additionally, if there 
was bias in the number of properties between the high-quality and low-quality school districts, the 
results might also have been biased accordingly. To deal with this concern, I estimated the number of 
samples in each area per month as the control variable. Additionally, I also made panel data which 
indicated the number of properties used for each area and month and estimated the number of 
properties regressed by the school quality indicator. The estimation equation used is as follows: 
𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 ∙ 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖 + 𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖 + 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
where 𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 indicated the number of posted properties in area 𝑗𝑗 in attendance district 𝑎𝑎 in quarter 
𝑇𝑇. As in the case of estimating of housing rents, to analyze the change in the relationship between 
school quality and the number of posted properties over time, I estimated by using the intersection 
terms of the quarterly dummy and school quality. The estimation equation used is as follows: 
𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼 + � 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖20
𝑖𝑖=2
+ 𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖 + 𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖 + 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
where 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 represented the impact of school quality on the number of posted properties for each 
quarter 𝑇𝑇. By these analyses, I was able to confirm that the number of posted properties had not 
changed in areas with high or low test scores. Specifically, there was no significant relationship 
between the number of posted properties and school quality. 
3.3. Enrollment and population 
Apart from analysis using housing rents, I also estimated the enrollments of each school and 
population by specific age of each area and each month as an independent variable to analyze the 
change in school and residential choice after disclosure. The estimation equation used is as follows: 
𝐸𝐸𝑙𝑙𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 ∙ 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖 + 𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖 + 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 ∙ 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖 + 𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖 + 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
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where 𝐸𝐸𝑙𝑙𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 indicated the number of enrollment students of school 𝑎𝑎, in year 𝑇𝑇, and 𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
indicated the number of people aged 𝐸𝐸 years old in area 𝑗𝑗 in attendance district 𝑎𝑎 in month 𝑇𝑇. For 
analysis on enrollment of students, I used panel data at the annual and school level, and analysis on 
population by age was estimated using panel data at the month and area level. 
  As with analysis of housing rents, I also analyzed changes in the effect of disclosure on 
population over time6. The estimation equation used is as follows: 
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼 + � 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖20
𝑖𝑖=2
+ 𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖 + 𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖 + 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
By this estimation, I analyzed the change in population in the area with high (low) test scores. 
 
 
4. Data 
In this study, I mainly used three kinds of data (e.g., housing, school, and district data). This 
section provides detailed information regarding the data used. 
4.1. About Matsue City 
Matsue City is a regional city in southwest Japan. Its population was approximately 200,000 and 
its population density was approximately 390 people per square meters in 2018. The average score 
on national tests of elementary school students in Matsue City in 2014 was 66.613, which was 
almost the same as the national average of 66.175; therefore, Matsue City was an average city in 
terms of academic achievement.  
In Matsue City, information on school quality was first disclosed in 2014. There was no official 
announcement on school quality (such as the average test score) before 2014, so parents were able to 
access this information for the first time after disclosure in 2014. Whether to disclose school-level 
results had been discussed since the beginning of 2014, and after disclosure had been decided upon, 
plans regarding it were announced on local news or websites a few months before the disclosure 
occurred. Therefore, it was believed that many people who lived in Matsue City knew about the 
disclosure and when it would take place. 
  There are several reasons why I focused on Matsue City, just like Kuroda (2018). The primary 
reason is that there are very few private elementary and junior high schools in Matsue City. If many 
private schools are present, the relationship between public school quality and housing rentals in the 
school district may be weakened because anyone can go to a private school regardless of where they 
live (Schwartz, Voicu, & Horn, 2014; Fack and Grenet, 2010). However, because there are few 
                                                  
6 Since enrollment data had a small number of samples, only population by age was estimated. 
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private schools in Matsue City, we could clearly identify the effect of public school test scores on 
housing rentals because it was difficult for students to receive primary education from somewhere 
other than public schools. 
  Furthermore, in Matsue City, a school choice system had not been introduced, and a school district 
existed. Therefore, the school that a student can attend is decided according to his/her residential 
address, and students cannot go to school outside the boundaries of their school district. In 
exceptional situations such as when an address is changed due to moving during the school fiscal 
year, students can go to school outside their school district; however, this situation is very rare. 
Therefore, in Matsue City, one’s place of residence is closely related to the quality of education that 
he or she can receive, and the importance of residential choice for parents with children is high. 
  Figure 1 presents a map of the school districts in Matsue City used for this study. The bold black 
lines represent public elementary school district boundaries, and only one school exists in each 
school district.7 There are 35 public elementary schools in Matsue City, but the number of schools 
used in this analysis was 25 because I could not use data for schools in non-urban areas where there 
were very few apartments in the district or where the district had a branch school that did not release 
its test scores due to a limited number of students. In Matsue City, the residential choice of parents 
could be influenced by school quality information due to identical school fees, lack of entrance 
examination, and the presence of several public transport options within the narrow area. 
 
Figure 1. Elementary School Districts of Matsue City 
                                                  
7 As an exception, one branch school exists. However, since its number of students during the analysis 
period was only one or two and its test scores were not disclosed, this school would not affect the 
estimation results. 
～ Attendance Districts 
・  Elementary Schools 
12 
 
4.2. Property data 
I used rental property data from 2012 to 2016 for Matsue City from the “Real Estate Database 
1999-2016.”8 This dataset includes nationwide real estate data from 1999 to 2016, and there are 
22,767 samples from 2012 to 2016 for Matsue City. As I mentioned in the previous section, this 
property data was obtained from data posted on real estate information websites and did not indicate 
actual transactions. Property offered for sale by the real estate agency was included in this dataset, 
and it contained the date that properties were posted as for sale on the real estate websites. 
In this study, I excluded land and sales property data from samples because I focused on rental 
properties. Each property had data on the property number, category (such as owned house or rental 
apartment, and newly or used), the rent or price, the occupied area (by square meter), the floor level, 
the number of floors in the building, the age of the building, the building’s construction (such as 
wooden or block), and the date of disclosure. As shown in Table 1, I set the dummy variables for 
each category (e.g. rental apartment, rental townhouse, rental mansion, rental store, or office9) and 
structure (e.g. autoclaved lightweight aerated concrete, precast concrete, reinforced concrete, steel 
reinforced concrete, block, light steel, steel, and wooden). Furthermore, I set the “after-disclosure 
dummy” and “the number of elapsed days after disclosure.”  
In this study, I defined apartments of over 40 square meters as "family-oriented apartments." In 
Japan, some real estate agencies have said that apartments with two or more rooms, or of 40 or more 
square meters are intended for families (e.g., Homemate, n.d.).10 As shown in Figure 2, it seems that 
40 square meters is the boundary between one room and two or more rooms, so this definition was 
considered reasonable. I derived the main results using samples which included family-oriented 
apartments. To confirm the robustness of this definition, I also made estimates that divided the 
sample according to the occupied area. 
Additionally, because this dataset did not contain a strict address, there were properties that could 
not be identified, such as to which school district a property belonged. In this study, since such 
properties were excluded from the sample, 16,065 properties (7,781 for families; 7,752 for singles; 
and 532 for rental shops and offices) were used for analysis.11 
I must address another concern regarding whether parents with elementary school children lived 
in the apartments, since many people live in their own houses rather than rental properties in 
                                                  
8 This dataset was provided by the Center for Spatial Information Science, the University of Tokyo. 
9 In Japan, the terms apartment, town house, and mansion all refer to a general type of residential real 
estate, indicating a meaning similar to "apartments" in American English. 
10 Of course, this definition changes depending on population density or economic conditions of a city, 
but in Japanese local cities, it is ordinarily said that an apartment with 40 or 50 square meters or more is 
intended for families. 
11 Analysis using all apartments and single-person apartments was also conducted, and the results were 
used for confirming the robustness of the main results. Summary statistics of samples of single-person 
apartments and rental shops/offices are shown in Appendix A. 
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Japanese cities. Therefore, I demonstrated the relationship between household type and housing 
format in Shimane Prefecture12 as follows. Table 2 indicates the number of households by type in 
Shimane Prefecture in 2013. The number of households in Shimane Prefecture was 254,700, of 
which 185,400 households (73%) lived in owned houses and 69,300 households (27%) lived in 
rented ones. However, households which had elementary school children (in this table, their age was 
assumed to be under 9 years old) exhibited a different tendency because many elderly households 
rather than younger ones tended to live in owned houses. Of all the three to five-person households 
evaluated, 5,100 households lived in owned houses and 8,800 households lived in rented ones. 
Specifically, over 60% of married couples with elementary school children lived in rented houses; 
therefore, it was reasonable to use the rented house for this study. 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Number of Properties by Occupied Area 
 
  
                                                  
12 Matsue City is the capital city of Shimane Prefecture, and holds approximately one-third of the 
population and households of the prefecture. Due to data constraints, I used Shimane Prefecture’s 
information instead of Matsue City’s. 
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Table 1. Summary Statistics (Main Estimation) 
  
Mean S.D. Min Max
House characteristics
　Housing rent (YEN) 58971 11189 35000 550000
　After-disclosure dummy 0.447 0.497 0 1
　Elapsed days after disclosure 168.600 238.209 0 801
　Number of floors 2.479 1.309 1 14
　Located floor 1.796 1.079 1 10
　Occupied area 53.130 9.130 40 106.640
　Age of building 14.050 7.942 0 50
　Rental apart dummy 0.800 0.400 0 1
　Rental town house dummy 0.006 0.074 0 1
　Rental mansion dummy 0.195 0.396 0 1
　Structure ALC dummy
　Structure PC dummy 0.002 0.045 0 1
　Structure RC dummy 0.136 0.343 0 1
　Structure SRC dummy 0.008 0.092 0 1
　Structure block dummy 0.001 0.025 0 1
　Structure light steel dummy 0.120 0.325 0 1
　Structure steel dummy 0.455 0.498 0 1
　Structure wooden dummy 0.278 0.448 0 1
　N
Area characteristics
　Number of households 496.272 588.424 8.4 4460
　Population 1151.646 1382.317 10.800 9250.200
　Average household size 2.269 0.378 1.286 3.280
　Number of children 141.891 184.623 0 1073
　Number of elementary students 77.132 98.131 0 559
　Average age 45.451 6.434 25.813 61.168
　Number of samples (family) 13.960 12.685 0 51
　Number of samples (single) 12.030 7.840 0 42
　Urban dummy 0.244 0.430 0 1
　North dummy 0.370 0.483 0 1
　N
School characteristics
　Number of enrollments 70.210 39.8166 8 185
　Test score 2014 66.613 3.202 59.525 72.750
　N
148
25
※ALC, PC, RC, and SRC stand for "Autoclaved Lightweight aerated Concrete", "Precast
Concrete", "Reinforced Concrete", and "Steel Reinforced Concrete", respectively.
NA
7781
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Table 2. Number of Households Living in Owned Houses and Rented Houses 
 
 
 
4.3. Area data 
 I obtained statistical data and information on school districts from Matsue City’s official website. 
Population census data are reported on the website monthly, and populations by age and gender in 
each area are described.13 In the main estimation, I used the number of households, population, 
average age, number of people per household, number of children (under 12 years old), number of 
elementary school students, and total population by each area and each month to control for local 
characteristics that change over time. The number of areas was 148, and details of each variable are 
shown in Table 1. In Matsue City, the residential environment is totally different in central urban 
areas versus the suburbs14, so I controlled for different time trends of housing rentals, respectively. 
Additionally, because the characteristics and amenities of houses are different between areas north 
and south of the central river, I also controlled for different trends, respectively. 
4.4. School data 
  In this study, I used two kinds of data on schools: the number of enrolled students and the results 
of academic achievement tests. The summary statistics are shown in Table 1. Test scores were 
derived from two types of tests: 6th grade elementary school students took the National Assessment 
of Academic Ability (NAAA), and 4th and 5th grade elementary school students took the Shimane 
Academic Ability Survey (SAAS). I used the sum of the math and language test scores, averaged 
over 3 years, as the test score for each school. The NAAA is the scholastic ability examination that 
the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT) has carried out once 
                                                  
13 In this study, the minimum unit of address was called "area." This is known as "cho-cho" in Japanese, 
which describes a location that is more detailed than a city but less detailed than an exact street address. 
Although not strict, it refers to a location such as a street name in the United States. 
14 Central urban areas are commercial areas that are centered about Matsue Station, and there are many 
residential areas and agricultural lands in the suburbs. 
Type of household Owned houses Rented houses Total
Total 185,400 69,300 254,700
Single-person households 33,100 35,000 68,100
Two-person households 60,800 14,000 74,800
Three- to five-person households
　　married couple and children (under 9 years old) 5,100 8,900 14,000
　　married couple and children (from 10 to 17 years old) 7,600 4,200 11,800
　　married couple and children (over 18 years old) 43,400 3,300 46,700
　　others 15,000 3,000 18,000
Over six-person households 15,300 800 16,100
※Created by editing 2013 Housing and Land Survey (Statistics Bureau, Ministry of Internal Affairs and
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per year since 2007, and it is applied to sixth and ninth graders. The SAAS is the scholastic ability 
examination that Shimane Prefecture originally conducted, and it is applied to 4th, 5th, and 6th 
graders in public elementary schools and students in public junior high schools. In Matsue City, 
however, the SAAS was applied only to 4th, 5th, 7th, and 8th grade students because 6th and 9th 
graders took the NAAA instead of the SAAS. 
 Both academic ability tests did not disclose school-level results before October 2014, and 
school-level results were first disclosed on October 22, 2014. The NAAA was administered on April 
22, 2014, and the SAAS was given on April 24th and 25th. After 2015, these tests began being 
conducted around May, and results are disclosed at the end of October every year. In this study, I 
considered the test scores of 2014 as the scores for each school and used them, since school-level 
test scores did not demonstrate extreme change over several years. 
For analysis, the test scores were converted into a deviation value, and the school rankings of the 
test scores were also used.15 This was because parents might have considered the rank of a school in 
the region, rather than how many points the school’s score had risen. In either case, results that were 
almost consistent were obtained, but I show both results below to compare the coefficients with the 
previous studies. 
 
 
5. Results and discussions 
5.1. Main results for the housing market 
Table 3 shows the results of estimating the housing samples by restricting them into 
family-oriented apartments.16 Column (1) indicates the results of using deviation values while 
controlling for house and area characteristics. This result shows that school quality had a significant 
positive effect on housing rents before disclosure of school quality information, and the effect was 
significantly increased additionally after disclosure. Column (2) shows the result of controlling time 
fixed effects in addition to column (1), but the result was almost the same as in the first column. 
Column (3) shows the result of adding area fixed effects to the control variables, and the coefficient 
of the interaction term of school quality indicator and the after-disclosure dummy still had 
significant positive effect, although the impact was weaker than in columns (1) and (2). Column (4) 
                                                  
15 The deviation value was obtained by normalizing the test score so that the mean was 50 and the 
standard deviation was 10, and this value is ordinarily used in Japan as the index of students’ academic 
achievement. Specifically, it is derived by dividing the difference between each test score and the mean of 
test scores by the standard deviation, multiplying by 10, and adding 50. 
16 I analyzed data using all the samples without dividing, but the results suggested that main variables 
had no significant effect on housing rents if I controlled for all the variables (see Appendix B and C). I 
interpreted these results as suggesting that the impact of family-oriented and single-person apartments 
was canceled out.  
17 
 
shows the result of adding the different trends in the central urban and suburban areas, and column 
(5) shows the result of adding the different trends in the northern and southern portions of the city, 
but the coefficients of the intersection term were still positive and significant. These results indicated 
that the rents of family-oriented apartments located within a high-quality school district significantly 
increased additionally after the disclosure of school quality information, and these results were 
robust even if various variables were controlled. The effect of the disclosure of school quality 
information on single-person apartments will be analyzed in a later subsection. The bottom part of 
Table 3 shows the results of estimation using school rank instead of deviation value as a proxy 
variable of school quality. Since the level of school ranking decreased as school quality increased, 
the main coefficients indicated the opposite of the results using deviation value. Column (6) shows 
the results of controlling the house and area characteristics similarly to column (1), and the results 
indicated that school quality had a significant positive effect on housing rents before disclosure, but 
the effect was strengthened by disclosure. The results of columns (7)-(10) are also similar to those of 
column (2)-(5). Summarizing the main result of this study, after disclosure of information on school 
quality, rents of family-oriented apartments located in a district with a high-quality school increased 
compared to those located in a school district with a low-quality school.17 
  Table 4 shows the result using the number of elapsed days from disclosure instead of the 
after-disclosure dummy, were other specifications the same as in Table 3. Columns (1) and (2) show 
the results of using deviation value without controlling the area fixed effects. Both results showed 
that the interaction terms were positive and significant coefficients, suggesting the possibility that 
test score would affect housing rents gradually as time passed after disclosure. Column (3) shows the 
results of adding the area fixed effects, Column (4) shows the result of adding the different trends in 
the central urban and suburban areas, and column (5) shows the result of adding the different trends 
in the northern and southern parts of the city. All the coefficients of intersection terms were still 
positive and significant, but the number of elapsed days had no significant effect on housing rents. 
The results from column (6) to column (10) showed the same results as column (1) to column (5), 
and there were no large differences between deviation value and school rank in this estimation. 
  To analyze the effect of changing over time, I estimated using the intersection terms of each 
quarter dummies and school quality indicator, and the results are shown in Table 5 and Figure 3.18 
Column (1) and column (2) show the results obtained using deviation value and school rank 
respectively. In Figure 3, the horizontal axis represents time, the vertical axis represents the 
                                                  
17 I also analyzed data using housing rents per occupied area used in previous studies instead of raw 
housing rents; however, the results were almost the same as those obtained using raw housing rents data. 
The results are shown in Appendix D. 
18 The result of estimating the effect of change over time using single-person apartments is shown in 
Appendix E. According to the results, rentals of single-person apartments showed a decreasing trend 
before disclosure, and the assumption of a parallel trend was not satisfied. Results using single-person 
apartments will be interpreted in detail in Section 5.2.1. 
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coefficient, the black dot represents the coefficients of interaction terms of each quarter dummy and 
school quality indicator, and each width represents the 95% confidence interval. According to the 
results of Table 5, school quality had a nearly significant effect on housing rents before disclosure of 
school quality information. Specifically, there was no significant difference in housing rents between 
high-quality school districts and low-quality school districts before disclosure, which also suggests 
that the probability of satisfying the parallel trend assumptions was high. However, after disclosure 
of school quality information, school quality had a significant positive effect on housing rents. These 
results emphasized that the rise in housing rents for family-oriented apartments was not due to prior 
trends or other shocks, but was certainly due to disclosure of school quality information. Although it 
was not statistically significant, it was important to note that even when controlling various variables 
and fixed effects, the rents of apartments in a high-quality school district were higher than those in a 
low-quality school district. This suggests that even before the official disclosure occurred, residents 
might have accessed school quality information from informal sources such as reputations or rumors. 
In fact, in areas where school quality information was not disclosed, unofficial information on school 
quality was available through parents’ interactions or local communities, so this is a plausible 
explanation. 
  Regarding the impact of the main regression results, the results for column (5) in Table 3 suggest 
that a 10-point increase in deviation value led to an approximately 0.05 percent additional increase in 
housing rents after disclosure. This implied that parents were willing to pay JPY294 more in 
monthly rent for housing, and this impact was very small (the mean associated with housing rents 
was approximately JPY59,000). This impact was about two-thirds of the result obtained by Kuroda 
(2018) that analyzed using cross-sectional data after disclosure in Matsue City. There were several 
reasons why the impact was small compared to previous studies on school quality and the housing 
market. First, school quality might have already been capitalized in relation to housing rentals to 
some extent before disclosure. As mentioned above, there were several ways to obtain information 
on school quality besides through the official disclosure, although accuracy was not guaranteed, so 
real estate agents and parents might have made decisions based on that information before the 
disclosure. In column (2) of Table 3, the sum of the coefficients of the deviation value and the 
interaction term suggests that housing rents increased by 3.7%, with the increase of one standard 
deviation, which was consistent with the results of several previous studies indicating that one 
standard deviation was related to a 2 - 5% higher property price ((Black, 1999; Bayer, Ferreira, & 
McMillan, 2007). Second, there might be strong heterogeneity among parents’ behavior with respect 
to school quality, as previous studies suggested (Koning and van der Wiel, 2013; Ries and 
Somerville, 2010). This might lead to a small impact and large significance indicating that a certain 
minority of parents are very concerned about school quality, but the majority do not care about it. 
Third, since there were not many parents interested in education compared to those in large cities 
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that were used in previous studies, the impact on the real estate market might be relatively small. 
Parents who are interested in education enough to care about elementary school quality tend to live 
in a metropolitan city where many schools are available that provide advanced elementary education. 
In fact, there are many high-quality private elementary schools, kindergartens, and cram schools for 
young children in large cities such as Tokyo, and supply and demand for advanced primary 
education are also high. Therefore, there may be relatively fewer parents who are interested in 
primary education for their children in smaller areas like Matsue City compared to large cities.  
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Table 3. Baseline Results 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Deviation value .0026*** .0025***
(.0001) (.0001)
After-disclosure dummy -.0710*** -.0642*** -.0281** -.0358*** -.0245**
(.0086) (.0105) (.0088) (.0093) (.0090)
Deviation value × After-disclosure dummy .0012*** .0012*** .0006*** .0007*** .0005**
(.0002) (.0002) (.0001) (.0002) (.0002)
Control variables
　House characteristics YES YES YES YES YES
　Area characteristics YES YES YES YES YES
　Time fixed effects YES YES YES YES
　Area fixed effects YES YES YES
　Urban/suburban trends YES YES
　North/south trends YES
N 7617 7598 7513 7494 7475
Adjusted R2 0.6638 0.6668 0.7754 0.7782 0.7795
(6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
School rank -.0033*** .-0033***
(.0002) (.0002)
After-disclosure dummy .0095* .0186* .0106 .0147* .0096
(.0039) (.0076) (.0058) (.0059) (.0058)
School rank × After-disclosure dummy -.0018*** -.0018*** -.0008*** -.0010*** -.0007***
(.0002) (.0002) (.0002) (.0002) (.0002)
Control variables
　House characteristics YES YES YES YES YES
　Area characteristics YES YES YES YES YES
　Time fixed effects YES YES YES YES
　Area fixed effects YES YES YES
　Urban/suburban trends YES YES
　North/south trends YES
N 7617 7598 7513 7494 7475
Adjusted R2 0.6623 0.6655 0.7754 0.7783 0.7795
※*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 5%, 1%, and 0.1%, respectively.
※Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the area level.
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Table 4. Elapsed Days 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Deviation value .0026*** .0026***
(.0001) (.0001)
Number of elapsed days -1.584×10-4*** -.8402×10-4 -.2082×10-4 -.3701×10-4 -.2163×10-4
(.1828×10-4) (.4599×10-4) (.3571×10-4) (.3599×10-4) (.3559×10-4)
Deviation value × Elapsed days 2.678×10-6*** 2.627×10-6*** 1.234×10-6*** 1.444×10-6*** 1.134×10-6***
(.3664×10-6) (.3630×10-6) (.3159×10-6) (.3421×10-6) (.3248×10-6)
Control variables
　House characteristics YES YES YES YES YES
　Area characteristics YES YES YES YES YES
　Time fixed effects YES YES YES YES
　Area fixed effects YES YES YES
　Urban/suburban trends YES YES
　North/south trends YES
N 7617 7598 7513 7494 7475
Adjusted R2 0.6636 0.6671 0.7755 0.7782 0.7796
(6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
School rank -.0034*** -.0034***
(.0002) (.0002)
Number of elapsed days 2.802×10-5*** 9.980×10-5* 6.316×10-5 6.092×10-5 5.416×10-5
(.8120×10-5) (4.378×10-5) (3.338×10-5) (3.342×10-5) (3.325×10-5)
School rank × Elapsed days -3.916×10-6*** -3.861×10-6*** -1.632×10-6*** -1.891×10-6*** -1.406×10-6***
(.4931×10-6) (.4900×10-6) (.4252×10-6) (.4530×10-6) (.4255×10-6)
Control variables
　House characteristics YES YES YES YES YES
　Area characteristics YES YES YES YES YES
　Time fixed effects YES YES YES YES
　Area fixed effects YES YES YES
　Urban/suburban trends YES YES
　North/south trends YES
N 7617 7598 7513 7494 7475
Adjusted R2 0.6618 0.6657 0.7755 0.7782 0.7795
※*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 5%, 1%, and 0.1%, respectively.
※Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the area level.
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Table 5. Changes in Effect Over Time 
 
Deviation value School rank
(1) (2)
Deviation value / School rank
　　　×2012 Q2 .0008 -.0016
(.0006) (.0009)
　　　×2012 Q3 .0015* -.0025**
(.0006) (.0009)
　　　×2012 Q4 .0004 -.0009
(.0007) (.0010)
　　　×2013 Q1 .0005 -.0011
(.0006) (.0009)
　　　×2013 Q2 .0006 -.0012
(.0006) (.0009)
　　　×2013 Q3 .0007 -.0013
(.0006) (.0009)
　　　×2013 Q4 .0004 -.0014
(.0006) (.0009)
　　　×2014 Q1 .0013* -.0027*
(.0006) (.0009)
　　　×2014 Q2 .0011 -.0022*
(.0006) (.0009)
　　　×2014 Q3 .0009 -.0017
(.0006) (.0009)
　　　×2014 Q4 (disclosure) .0007 -.0016
(.0006) (.0008)
　　　×2015 Q1 .0010 -.0017*
(.0006) (.0009)
　　　×2015 Q2 .0018** -.0028**
(.0006) (.0009)
　　　×2015 Q3 .0015* -.0022**
(.0006) (.0008)
　　　×2015 Q4 .0019*** -.0028***
(.0006) (.0008)
　　　×2016 Q1 .0017** -.0027**
(.0006) (.0008)
　　　×2016 Q2 .0012 -.0020*
(.0006) (.0009)
　　　×2016 Q3 .0014* -.0023*
(.0007) (.0009)
　　　×2016 Q4 .0017** -.0024*
(.0006) (.0009)
N 7492 7492
Adjusted R2 0.7770 0.7771
※*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 5%, 1%, and 0.1%, respectively.
※Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the area level.
※All control variables (house characteristics, area characteristics, year fixed effects,
   area fixed effects, urban/suburban trends, and north/south trends) were controlled.
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Table 5 - Column (1), 
Changes in the effect of deviation value on rents of family-oriented apartments  
 
Table 5 - Column (2), 
Changes in the effect of school rank on rents of family-oriented apartments 
 
Figure 3. Changes in Effect Over Time 
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 In summary, the main finding in this study showed that school quality indicators such as deviation 
value and school rank had a significantly positive effect on rents of family-oriented apartments after 
disclosure of school quality information. Even before disclosure, school quality might have had a 
positive effect on housing rents. In the following section, I also analyze information concerning the 
heterogeneity of properties and verify that the main results were certainly derived from disclosure of 
information on school quality. 
 
 
5.2. Various concerns 
5.2.1. Placebo test 
To ensure that change in rents of apartments was caused from nothing else but disclosure of 
school quality information, I conducted a placebo test using rents of units other than family-oriented 
apartments. If events which could have affected housing rents occurred at the same time as 
disclosure, the rent of properties such as shops and offices or single-person apartments that would 
not have been affected intrinsically by school quality might also have been impacted. To address this 
concern, I obtained results using rental shops, offices, and single-person apartments by estimating 
the same equation used in the main estimation. Table 6 shows the results obtained using rental shops 
and offices, and these results suggest that all the main variables are statistically insignificant if 
controlling for various variables. Of course, I must note that the rental shops and offices were 
located mainly in commercial areas and the number of samples was smaller than that of the 
residential properties. 
Therefore, I analyzed data using single-person apartments. These apartments are located widely in 
the city, and in my dataset, the number of samples was almost the same as that of family-oriented 
apartments (7,781 for families; 7,752 for singles). The results are shown in Table 7, and the basic 
specification was the same as the main estimation. Columns (1), (2), (6), and (7) show results not 
controlling for regional fixed effects and coefficients of interaction terms that were indicated 
consistently negative, although significances were low. However, the results after controlling for 
area fixed effects and urban/suburban trends are shown in columns (3), (4), (8), and (9). These 
results suggest that school quality has a significantly negative effect on housing rents after disclosure. 
However, controlling the northern/southern trends weakened the significance of coefficients of 
interaction terms, and in column (10), which shows the result obtained by using school rank, the 
coefficient of the interaction term was insignificant. Additionally, as a result of analyzing the 
changes of the effect over time using quarterly dummies, we could see that housing rents for 
single-person apartments tended to decrease in areas with high test scores even before disclosure. 
(The results are shown in Appendix E.) In summary, the results in this section indicated that 
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disclosure of school quality information had no significant effect on housing rents of single-person 
apartments, nor had any events occurred that affected the housing market at the same time as the 
disclosure. 
As for what actually happens regarding single-person apartments, this can be inferred by 
considering the demanders of these units. University students can be cited as major users of 
single-person apartments in smaller cities in Japan. Shimane University, which has approximately 
6,000 students, is located in Matsue City, and the residential area of the university’s students 
overlaps with the attendance districts of two elementary schools which rank 1st and 2nd in test 
scores.19 The number of enrolled students at Shimane University is decreasing every year, which 
may be one reason why rents of single-person apartments are decreasing in an area that has 
high-quality schools.20 In fact, enrollments decreased by approximately 100 (from 1,602 to 1,507) 
between 2008 and 2016. Specifically, enrollments decreased by 43 (from 1,576 to 1,530) between 
2013 and 2014 when housing rents of single-person apartments decreased significantly. Therefore, it 
seems that the downtrend of rents of single-person apartments might be due to the decreasing 
number of university students, and not the effect of disclosure. 
  
                                                  
19 The definition of the residential area where the students of Shimane University live is based on the 
standards published by the Shimane University Cooperative. 
20 According to statistical information published by Matsue City, the populations of the "north" and 
"south" areas are almost the same (the north has 73,576 people, and the south has 72,595). However, the 
northern area where Shimane University is located has more than 800 people aged 18 to 22 than the 
southern area does. Therefore, the existence of Shimane University and the number of students can affect 
the housing market. 
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Table 6. Results using Shops and Offices 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Deviation value -.0124 .-0216*
(.0094) (.0085)
After-disclosure dummy .4320 .4751 .4888 .2837 .4013
(.6519) (.2917) (.3919) (.6089) (.9596)
Deviation value × After-disclosure dummy -.0076 .-0080* -.0082 -.0047 .0063
(.0099) (.0038) (.0055) (.0086) (.0139)
Control variables
　House characteristics YES YES YES YES YES
　Area characteristics YES YES YES YES YES
　Time fixed effects YES YES YES YES
　Area fixed effects YES YES YES
　Urban/suburban trends YES YES
　North/south trends YES
N 474 455 448 429 414
Adjusted R2 0.8621 0.8785 0.8790 0.8811 0.8805
(6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
School rank .0169 .0390*
(.0181) (.0169)
After-disclosure dummy -.1069* -.0815 -.0810 -.0255 .0593
(.0416) (.1265) (.1182) (.0841) (.0619)
School rank × After-disclosure dummy .0022 .0115 -.0111 .0028 -.0126
(.0062) (.0061) (.0082) (.0139) (.0202)
Control variables
　House characteristics YES YES YES YES YES
　Area characteristics YES YES YES YES YES
　Time fixed effects YES YES YES YES
　Area fixed effects YES YES YES
　Urban/suburban trends YES YES
　North/south trends YES
N 474 455 448 429 414
Adjusted R2 0.8619 0.8781 0.8788 0.8810 0.8806
※*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 5%, 1%, and 0.1%, respectively.
※Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the area level.
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Table 7. Results using Single-Person Apartments 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Deviation value .0012*** .0011***
(.0002) (.0002)
After-disclosure dummy .0629*** .0099 .0328* .0364* .0241
(.0115) (.0166) (.0149) (.0148) (.0158)
Deviation value × After-disclosure dummy -.0004 -.0004* -.0007*** -.0008*** -.0006*
(.0002) (.0002) (.0002) (.0002) (.0002)
Control variables
　House characteristics YES YES YES YES YES
　Area characteristics YES YES YES YES YES
　Time fixed effects YES YES YES YES
　Area fixed effects YES YES YES
　Urban/suburban trends YES YES
　North/south trends YES
N 7716 7697 7609 7590 7571
Adjusted R2 0.6161 0.6239 0.7537 0.7558 0.7560
(6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
School rank -.0020*** -.0020***
(.0003) (.0003)
After-disclosure dummy .0377 -.0159 -.0126 -.0135 .0098
(.0046) (.0123) (.0099) (.0098) (.0099)
School rank × After-disclosure dummy .0003 .0003 .0007* .0008** .0004
(.0003) (.0003) (.0003) (.0003) (.0003)
Control variables
　House characteristics YES YES YES YES YES
　Area characteristics YES YES YES YES YES
　Time fixed effects YES YES YES YES
　Area fixed effects YES YES YES
　Urban/suburban trends YES YES
　North/south trends YES
N 7716 7697 7609 7590 7571
Adjusted R2 0.6175 0.6255 0.7535 0.7556 0.7558
※*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 5%, 1%, and 0.1%, respectively.
※Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the area level.
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5.2.2. Estimation of divided samples 
  In this section, I analyzed data considering heterogeneity of effect regarding school quality and 
disclosure. The degree of effect of school quality might differ depending on house characteristics or 
location. As larger houses are better suited for families, people living in these dwellings are likely to 
have children and may be more concerned about school quality. Additionally, parents with higher 
education and income tend to live in larger houses, so rents of these units may be more affected by 
test scores. Furthermore, since the definition of an area suitable for occupation by a family (over 40 
square meters) is arbitrary, I must also analyze data using occupied areas other than those meeting 
this definition. To address this concern, I estimated by dividing the sample according to occupied 
area. 
Table 8 shows the result of estimation performed by dividing all the samples by every 10 square 
meters according to the occupied area. The upper part of the table shows the results obtained using 
deviation value, and the lower part shows the results obtained using school rank. Most of the 
intersection terms of interest were not significant, but the interaction terms in columns (3), (6), and 
(12) were significant. The result of column (3) suggests that rents of apartments of 30-40 square 
meters in size that were located in high-quality school districts decreased after disclosure of school 
quality information. However, as mentioned in the previous section, this result might be led by the 
effect of the decreasing number of university students, not disclosure. The results of columns (6) and 
(12) suggest that the rents of apartments of over 60 square meters in size that were located in 
high-quality school districts significantly increased after disclosure of school quality information. 
The results showed that the more housing units were intended to be lived in by families, the more 
they were affected by school quality. This tendency was consistent with the results of previous 
studies (Kuroda, 2018; Carrillo, Cellini, and Green, 2013). Additionally, this result also suggests that 
high income or highly educated parents that tend to live in larger apartments may care more about 
school quality. 
The effect of school quality on housing rents might differ depending not only on the size of the 
apartment, but also on the area where the apartment is located. An apartment located in an area 
where there are many children may be more affected by test scores. Conversely, even apartments 
intended for families may not be affected by school quality if they are in areas with few children. 
Specifically, if disclosure of school quality information has a significant effect on housing rents even 
in areas with few children, this suggests the possibility that events affecting housing rents other than 
disclosure were occurring at the same time. To address this concern, I estimated by dividing the 
sample according to the number of children in each area. 
  Table 9 shows the result of estimation performed by dividing all samples according to the number 
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of children in the area where each sample was located.2122 The upper part of the table shows the 
results obtained using deviation value, and the lower part shows the results obtained using school 
rank. Additionally, the results of the estimation obtained by using samples located in areas with a 
relatively high number of children are shown in columns on the table’s left side. Conversely, the 
columns on the table’s right side show the results of analysis performed using apartments located in 
areas with relatively few children. Columns (1) and (7) show the results estimated using apartments 
in areas where there were over 100 children, indicating that school quality significantly increased 
housing rents after disclosure. Columns (2) and (8) show the results estimated using apartments in 
areas where there were over 150 children, which indicated almost the same result as shown in 
columns (1) and (7). Columns (3) and (9) show the results obtained using apartments located in areas 
which had over 200 children, and these results also indicated that housing rents increased in 
high-quality school areas after disclosure, but the coefficients of the interaction terms became three 
times larger. This indicated that the apartments located in areas with especially high numbers of 
children were more affected by school quality after disclosure. These results might be derived from 
the large ratio of families with children in the total demanders of larger apartments. However, the 
results of using apartments located in areas with few children are shown in Columns (4)-(6) and 
(10)-(12), and all coefficients were not significant. This indicates that even family-oriented 
apartments are not affected by school quality in areas with relatively few children. The results in 
Table 9 were consistent with the results and discussions presented so far and emphasized that school 
quality information and its disclosure were certainly affecting families and children. Additionally, 
the results of this section suggest that the degree of effect of school quality is different depending on 
house characteristics and location. 
 
  
                                                  
21 In this analysis, people under 12 years old were defined as "children." 
22 I also analyzed data by dividing all samples according to the child population density in the area where 
each sample was located; however, the results were almost the same as those obtained using the number 
of children in the area. The results are shown in Appendix F. 
30 
 
Table 8. Sample Divided According to Occupied Area 
 
  
under 20 20 to 30 30 to 40 40 to 50 50 to 60 over 60
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
After-disclosure dummy .0589 -.0208 .0799** .0130 -.0111 -.0469**
(.0547) (.0150) (.0275) (.0145) (.0143) (.0151)
Deviation value × After-disclosure dummy -.0006 .0003 .-0009* .0000 .0002 .0009***
(.0009) (.0002) (.0004) (.0003) (.0002) (.0003)
Control variables
　House characteristics YES YES YES YES YES YES
　Area characteristics YES YES YES YES YES YES
　Time fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
　Area fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
　Urban/suburban trends YES YES YES YES YES YES
　North/south trends YES YES YES YES YES YES
N 918 5159 1263 2898 2586 1728
Adjusted R2 0.9271 0.7871 0.8446 0.7385 0.5722 0.9132
under 20 20 to 30 30 to 40 40 to 50 50 to 60 over 60
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
After-disclosure dummy .0209 -.0008 .0210 .0100 .0052 .0155
(.0244) (.0097) (.0115) (.0092) (.0095) (.0098)
School rank × After-disclosure dummy .0003 -.0005 .0007 .0001 -.0005 -.0012***
(.0014) (.0003) (.0006) (.0003) (.0003) (.0003)
Control variables
　House characteristics YES YES YES YES YES YES
　Area characteristics YES YES YES YES YES YES
　Time fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
　Area fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
　Urban/suburban trends YES YES YES YES YES YES
　North/south trends YES YES YES YES YES YES
N 918 5159 1263 2898 2586 1728
Adjusted R2 0.9271 0.7872 0.8441 0.7385 0.5722 0.9132
※*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 5%, 1%, and 0.1%, respectively.
※Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the area level.
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Table 9. Sample Divided According to the Number of Children in an Area 
 
  
over 100 over 150 over 200 under 100 under 150 under 200
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
After-disclosure dummy -.0291** -.0295** -.0898*** -.0362 -.0199 -.0102
(.0106) (.0114) (.0162) (.0254) (.0180) (.0141)
Deviation value × After-disclosure dummy .0006** .0006** .0019*** .0008 .0005 .0003
(.0002) (.0002) (.0003) (.0005) (.0003) (.0002)
Control variables
　House characteristics YES YES YES YES YES YES
　Area characteristics YES YES YES YES YES YES
　Time fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
　Area fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
　Urban/suburban trends YES YES YES YES YES YES
　North/south trends YES YES YES YES YES YES
N 6265 5394 4325 1128 2000 3068
Adjusted R2 0.7657 0.7294 0.7135 0.8900 0.8620 0.8612
over 100 over 150 over 200 under100 under 150 under 200
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
After-disclosure dummy .0135* .0119 .0375*** .0121 .0135 .0120
(.0068) (.0073) (.0092) (.0171) (.0113) (.0085)
School rank × After-disclosure dummy -.0010*** -.0008** -.0024*** -.0008 -.0008 -.0006
(.0002) (.0003) (.0004) (.0006) (.0004) (.0003)
Control variables
　House characteristics YES YES YES YES YES YES
　Area characteristics YES YES YES YES YES YES
　Time fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
　Area fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
　Urban/suburban trends YES YES YES YES YES YES
　North/south trends YES YES YES YES YES YES
N 6265 5394 4325 1128 2000 3068
Adjusted R2 0.7658 0.7293 0.7133 0.8899 0.8620 0.8613
※*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 5%, 1%, and 0.1%, respectively.
※Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the area level.
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5.2.3. Considering the effect of the number of posted apartments 
In this study, all the analysis employing property data used data that was posted on websites, 
which meant they did not indicate actual transactions. Therefore, during the analysis period, if many 
cheap apartments were posted at once in a specific area, it might seem as though housing rents had 
decreased in that area. Conversely, if a luxury condominium was built and many rooms were sold at 
the same time, it would seem as though housing rents had increased in the area. Thus, if the number 
of posted apartments in areas was biased, the result might also be biased. 
To address this concern, I created panel data of the number of posted family-oriented apartments 
in each month and each area, and then estimated the effect of school quality and its disclosure on the 
number of samples in each month and each area. The results are shown in Table 10, and when 
controlling for several variables, all the coefficients of main variables were not significant. This 
result suggests that there is no significant relationship between disclosure of school quality 
information and the number of posted apartments and confirms that the main results of this study did 
not derive from the number of samples in a specific area. 
Additionally, I performed an estimation using the intersection terms of each quarter dummy and 
school quality indicator to analyze the changes in effect of school quality on the number of 
apartments over time, and the results are shown in Table 11 and Figure 4.23 In Figure 4, the 
horizontal axis represents time, the vertical axis represents the coefficient, the black dot represents 
the coefficients of interaction terms of each quarter dummy and school quality indicator, and each 
width represents a 95% confidence interval. This result shows that almost all the coefficients were 
insignificant and there was no specific trend during the analysis period. Additionally, there was no 
particular change observed before or after disclosure. Therefore, we confirmed that many apartments 
were not posted in areas with high-quality schools, and that the main results were obtained from the 
change in housing rents, not the number of posted samples. 
 
 
  
                                                  
23 I conducted the same analysis using single-person apartments, and the results are shown in Appendix 
G. As a result, there was no significant relationship between school quality and the number of posted 
single-person apartments, and no specific trends through time were observed. 
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Table 10. Number of Family-Oriented Apartments 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Deviation value -.0309*** -.0309***
(.0038) (.0038)
After-disclosure dummy .1880 .1607 .1607 .0332 -.0869
(.3955) (.6029) (.2262) (.2263) (.2300)
Deviation value × After-disclosure dummy -.0028 -.0028 -.0028 -.0005 .0018
(.0061) (.0062) (.0029) (.0029) (.0030)
Control variables
　Time fixed effects YES YES YES YES
　Area fixed effects YES YES YES
　Urban/suburban trends YES YES
　North/south trends YES
N 6836 6817 6705 6686 6667
Adjusted R2 0.0095 0.0102 0.8569 0.8577 0.8585
(6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
School rank .0521*** .0521***
(.0062) (.0062)
After-disclosure dummy -.0205 -.0479 -.0479 -.0146 -.0172
(.0635) (.4365) (.1493) (.1488) (.1480)
School rank × After-disclosure dummy .0054 .0054 .0054 .0022 .0008
(.0100) (.0100) (.0042) (.0042) (.0043)
Control variables
　Time fixed effects YES YES YES YES
　Area fixed effects YES YES YES
　Urban/suburban trends YES YES
　North/south trends YES
N 6836 6817 6705 6686 6667
Adjusted R2 0.0146 0.0152 0.8569 0.8577 0.8585
※*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 5%, 1%, and 0.1%, respectively.
※Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the school district level.
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Table 11. Changes in Effect Over Time (Number of Samples) 
 
Deviation value School rank
(1) (2)
Deviation value / School rank
　　　×2012 Q2 .0112 -.0141
(.0078) (.0118)
　　　×2012 Q3 .0149 -.0212
(.0082) (.0125)
　　　×2012 Q4 .0219* -.0273*
(.0089) (.0131)
　　　×2013 Q1 .0232** .0306*
(.0083) (.0124)
　　　×2013 Q2 -.0098 .0187
(.0091) (.0135)
　　　×2013 Q3 .0045 -.0033
(.0085) (.0125)
　　　×2013 Q4 .0008 -.0013
(.0081) (.0119)
　　　×2014 Q1 -.0045 .0076
(.0087) (.0130)
　　　×2014 Q2 -.0041 .0097
(.0079) (.0114)
　　　×2014 Q3 .0135 -.0212
(.0099) (.0141)
　　　×2014 Q4 (disclosure) .0049 -.0013
(.0088) (.0126)
　　　×2015 Q1 .0012 .0001
(.0074) (.0108)
　　　×2015 Q2 -.0003 .0076
(.0098) (.0145)
　　　×2015 Q3 -.0002 -.0011
(.0105) (.0156)
　　　×2015 Q4 .0089 -.0114
(.0090) (.0134)
　　　×2016 Q1 .0093 -.0110
(.0087) (.0131)
　　　×2016 Q2 .0194* .0226*
(.0076) (.0111)
　　　×2016 Q3 .0226** -.0256*
(.0083) (.0120)
　　　×2016 Q4 .0074 -.0072
(.0081) (.0118)
N 6650 6650
Adjusted R2 0.8588 0.8589
※*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 5%, 1%, and 0.1%, respectively.
※Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the school district level.
※All control variables (time fixed effects, area fixed effects, urban/suburban trends, and
north/south trends) were controlled.
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Table 11 - Column (1), 
Changes in the effect of deviation value on the number of family-oriented properties 
 
Table 11 - Column (2), 
Changes in the effect of school rank on the number of family-oriented properties 
 
Figure 4. Changes in Effect Over Time (Number of Samples) 
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5.3. Results for enrollment and population 
 So far, it has been shown that rents of family-oriented apartments increased after disclosure of 
school quality information. However, as pointed out in previous studies, we should consider whether 
the changes in housing rents actually reflect parents’ willingness to pay for their children's education, 
or whether they were simply caused from advertisement behavior of real estate agents (Carrillo, 
Cellini, and Green 2013; Haisken-DeNew et.al, 2018). If population did not change despite the 
number of housing rents increasing in areas with high-quality schools after disclosure, this might 
only indicate that real estate agencies advertised high-quality schools and set high rental prices. 
However, if the number of children increased in high-quality school districts after disclosure, this 
could suggest that not only real estate agencies’ but also parents’ behavior was changed by the 
disclosure. Therefore, in this section, I discuss the results focusing on school and residential choice 
behavior of parents and children. Here, I analyze changes in the number of enrolled students at each 
school and the population in each area. Analysis using the number of enrolled students can more 
accurately capture the change in parental behavior caused by disclosure; however, a problem exists 
in that the sample is very small because it is based on yearly data. Therefore, I conducted a more 
detailed analysis by using data that included population by each age in each area. 
  Parents have incentives to send their children to better schools, so disclosure of school quality 
information may increase the number of students enrolled in high-quality schools (Hastings and 
Weinstein, 2008; Koning and van der Wiel, 2013; Nunes, Reis, and Seabra, 2015). To confirm this 
effect, I will discuss the results of analyzing the effect of school quality information and its 
disclosure on the number of enrolled students, using the data of elementary school entrants. Table 12 
shows the results, with the upper part of the table representing the results obtained using deviation 
value and the lower part representing the results obtained using school rank. Additionally, the table’s 
left half shows the results obtained using data from 2012 to 2016, and the right half shows the results 
obtained using data from 2011 to 2018. These results indicate that regardless of which control 
variables were used, disclosure of school quality information would not significantly affect the 
number of enrolled students. Although this effect was not statistically significant, the disclosure of 
school quality tended to have a consistently positive effect on the number of enrolled students. In 
this analysis, even if the analysis period was expanded, we had to consider that the sample size was 
still small. Therefore, to address this concern, I analyzed the effect of school quality and its 
disclosure on the population of each area by age. 
  Columns (1) and (6) of Table 13 show the results estimated by using the population of children 
who were seven years old for each month in each area as explained variables. In Japan, since 
children entering elementary school must be seven years of age, the population of seven-year-olds 
represents the number of first-year elementary students in that area (i.e., the number of enrolled 
students). According to the results of columns (1) and (6), the number of first graders in elementary 
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school has increased significantly in areas with high-quality schools after disclosure of information. 
Considering the error range of one year which was caused due to variations in school year and 
birthdays, columns (3) and (8) show the results using the total population of six- to eight-year-old 
children instead of only seven-year-olds, and the interaction terms indicated a significantly positive 
result similar to those shown in columns (1) and (6). Additionally, to address the concern that not 
only the first-grade but also the entire population was fluctuating, I conducted an analysis using the 
three- to five-year-old population and the nine- to eleven-year-old population for comparison. 
According to the results of columns (2) and (7), the number of kindergarten children might increase 
in areas with high-quality primary schools after disclosure, but the effect was not significant. 
Columns (4) and (8) show the results obtained using nine- to eleven-year-old students who had 
selected elementary schools before disclosure, and there was no significant relationship between the 
number of children and school quality after disclosure. This suggests reasonable results indicating 
that change in population can be seen only when residential choice is timed according to elementary 
school entry, when it is easy to move. Furthermore, columns (5) and (10) show the results of using a 
population aged 18 to 22, which is the age of university students. The coefficients of the interaction 
terms were negative and significant, which was consistent with the information indicating that the 
number of enrolled students at the university was decreasing, which I mentioned in the above section. 
Additionally, the decrease of the population of university-aged students was considered to be one 
reason for the declining trends of rentals of single-person apartments in high-quality school areas.24 
  
                                                  
24 I also analyzed information regarding the ages of the parent generation, but consistent results were not 
obtained. Unlike young students, adults have various socioeconomic characteristics, so it is difficult to 
capture specific effects. 
38 
 
Table 12. Number of Enrolled Students 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Deviation value × After-disclosure dummy .1330 .1699 .1522 .1940 .2176 .1738
(.2331) (.2345) (.2342) (.2005) (.2033) (.1961)
Control variables
　School fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
　Time fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
　Urban/suburban trends YES YES YES YES
　North/south trends YES YES
N 75 71 67 132 125 118
Adjusted R2 0.9529 0.9533 0.9539 0.9441 0.9436 0.9481
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
School rank × After-disclosure dummy -.0516 -.0938 -.0850 -.0686 -.0944 -.0748
(.1720) (.1751) (.1742) (.1481) (.1521) (.1459)
Control variables
　School fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
　Time fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
　Urban/suburban trends YES YES YES YES
　North/south trends YES YES
N 75 71 67 132 125 118
Adjusted R2 0.9528 0.9531 0.9538 0.9438 0.9433 0.9479
※*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 5%, 1%, and 0.1%, respectively.
2012 ~ 2016 2011 ~ 2018
2012 ~ 2016 2011 ~ 2018
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Table 13. Population in Area by Age 
 
 
 
Figure 5 shows the results using the seven-year-old population of each month in each area as an 
independent variable and using the intersection terms of the quarterly dummies and the school 
quality indicators. This result showed that there was no significant difference in the seven-year-old 
population between high-quality and low-quality school areas before disclosure, but the 
seven-year-old population was increasing significantly after disclosure. Furthermore, its impact was 
large for one year after disclosure, which was similar to the effect on housing rents (see Figure 3). 
In summary, the population of first graders of elementary schools in areas with high-quality 
schools increased after disclosure of information on school quality. This suggests that parents with 
children chose their residential area by referring to recently disclosed school quality information.  
7 years old 3-5 years old 6-8 years old 9-11 years old 18-22 years old
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
After-disclosure dummy -1.461** -.7565 -2.144** .7573 4.136***
(.0106) (.6445) (.6685) (.6011) (.8005)
Deviation value × After-disclosure dummy .0307*** .0140 .0407*** -.0159 -.0791***
(.0062) (.0096) (.0097) (.0102) (.0131)
Control variables
　Area characteristics YES YES YES YES YES
　Time fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES
　Area fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES
　Urban/suburban trends YES YES YES YES YES
　North/south trends YES YES YES YES YES
N 7373 7373 7373 7373 7373
Adjusted R2 0.9856 0.9856 0.9832 0.9800 0.9895
7 years old 3-5 years old 6-8 years old 9-11 years old 18-22 years old
(6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
After-disclosure dummy .6118 .1268 .5585 -.2204 -1.046*
(.3285) (.3912) (.3259) (.3231) (.4353)
School rank × After-disclosure dummy -.0336*** -.0107 -.0411*** .1042 .0751***
(.0070) (.0108) (.0108) (.0116) (.0148)
Control variables
　House characteristics YES YES YES YES YES
　Area characteristics YES YES YES YES YES
　Time fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES
　Area fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES
　Urban/suburban trends YES YES YES YES YES
　North/south trends YES YES YES YES YES
N 7373 7373 7373 7373 7373
Adjusted R2 0.9377 0.9856 0.9832 0.9800 0.9895
※*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 5%, 1%, and 0.1%, respectively.
※Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the area level.
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Number of seven-year-old children, Deviation Value 
 
Number of seven-year-old children, School Rank 
 
Figure 5. Changes in Effect Over Time (Seven-Year-Old Children) 
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5.4. Disparity in academic achievement 
Finally, I confirmed whether disparity of academic achievement among schools had increased as a 
result of disclosure of school quality information. Through disclosure of this information, parents 
will be able to choose good schools, and housing rents in areas with good school quality will 
increase. Therefore, parents with more willingness to pay for their children's education will be able 
to send their children to better schools. Additionally, such parents tend to have high educational 
backgrounds and income, or enthusiasm for their children, so the academic ability of their children 
also tends to be higher. Therefore, good (bad) students tend to gather at good (bad) schools, and the 
sorting of students may occur due to disclosure. As a result, good schools will be better, bad schools 
will be worse, and disparity in academic performance between schools can expand. 
Table 14 shows the results of average test scores and indicators of disparity by school from 2014 
to 2017.25 The test in 2014 was administered before disclosure, and the tests after 2015 were 
conducted subsequent to disclosure. This table shows that the relative standard deviation was 0.048 
before disclosure, but it increased consistently to about 0.06 after disclosure. Additionally, we can 
see that the difference between better and worse schools has also expanded after disclosure of school 
quality information. These results suggest that disparity between schools may be expanding through 
the sorting of students due to disclosure of information on school quality. 
  Although it has been confirmed that disparity has expanded, we must compare the results with 
other municipalities in which information on school quality has not been disclosed and confirm that 
the expansion is caused from disclosure. However, because the data of other municipalities regarding 
school quality information have not been disclosed and cannot be used, this point indicates a 
limitation of this study. 
  Additionally, it is also important to analyze the performance of students enrolled after disclosure. 
If high-quality schools gather high-quality students due to disclosure of school quality information, it 
might cause a widening of disparities. Such data will be available in a few years, so this is a task for 
future research. 
 
  
                                                  
25 Regarding examination in 2017, fourth graders were not administered the exam because of the change 
of the institution, and the results show the average test scores of fifth and six graders. All the test scores 
before 2016 show the average of fourth, fifth, and sixth grade students. 
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Table 14. Disparity in Academic Achievement 
  
Before disclosure
2014 2015 2016 (2017)
Mean 66.613 61.324 64.604 63.247
Standard deviation 3.202 3.914 4.027 3.839
Relative standard deviation 0.048 0.064 0.062 0.061
Max 72.750 71.850 70.663 70.833
Min 59.525 52.850 55.150 56.000
　(Max - Min) / Mean 0.199 0.310 0.240 0.235
Average of upper half 69.102 64.431 67.957 66.244
Average of lower half 63.957 58.217 61.252 60.036
　(Avg. of upper half - Avg. of lower half) / Mean 0.077 0.101 0.104 0.098
Average of top 5 71.430 66.943 69.590 68.433
Average of bottom 5 61.618 55.608 57.580 57.467
　(Avg. of top 5 - Avg. of bottom 5) / Mean 0.147 0.185 0.186 0.173
After disclosure
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6. Conclusions 
This study investigated the effect of disclosure of school quality information on housing rents, 
population by age, and disparity in the academic ability of students between schools. I found that 
school quality indicators such as deviation value and school rank had a significantly positive effect 
on rents of family-oriented apartments after disclosure of school quality information. Additionally, 
the more that units were intended to be lived in by families, the more they were affected by school 
quality. However, even if an apartment was family-oriented, it was not affected by school quality in 
areas with relatively few children. These results were consistent with results obtained from previous 
studies. 
I also found that disclosure significantly increased the population of elementary school-aged 
children within the attendance district of schools with high test scores. This suggests that parents 
with children chose their residential area by referring to the school quality information that had just 
been disclosed. As in the case of rent, although the significance was high, the impact is not. This 
might be because a minority of parents are very concerned about school quality, but the majority do 
not care about it. In this study, I could not identify whether parents were directly affected by the 
disclosure of school quality information or indirectly affected by the advertisement of real estate 
agencies. Even if this result might be caused from real estate agency advertisements, as noted in 
previous studies, it is still important to identify if parents are actually moving since there is a 
possibility that sorting of students may occur by the gathering of people in high-quality school 
districts. Whether sorting has occurred can also be observed by examining changes in academic 
performance by school. 
Finally, I found that the relative standard deviation of test scores after disclosure became larger 
than before disclosure. These results suggest that disparity between schools may be expanding due to 
disclosure, and this may have been caused by the sorting of students. Specifically, this result may 
suggest that children with high abilities who have parents with more willingness to pay for their 
education are gathered at high-quality schools as a result of disclosure of school quality information. 
To summarize the results in this study, the following findings were obtained. Due to disclosure of 
school quality information, rents of apartments located in high-quality school districts increased. At 
the same time, the number of elementary school first graders increased in high-quality school 
districts. As a result, student sorting appeared to occur, and therefore disparity of academic 
achievement between schools increased. In conclusion, through disclosure of school quality 
information, it is suggested that disparity of academic achievement between schools may increase 
through changes in the property market and residential choice. 
However, I have concern that the analysis in disparity is simply a comparison between data before 
and after disclosure, and it is not possible to mention causality. Therefore, I must compare the results 
with other municipalities that have not been discussed and confirm that the expansion is caused from 
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disclosure. Additionally, from the point of view concerning disparity among schools, I must 
investigate whether high-quality schools accumulate high-quality students after disclosure of school 
quality information using future data.  
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Appendix A. Summary Statistics (Single-Person Apartment, Rental Shop/Office) 
 
  
Mean S.D. Min Max Mean S.D. Min Max
House characteristics
　Housing rent (YEN) 43374 6605 15000 66100 144164 111968 25000 486000
　After-disclosure dummy 0.412 0.492 0 1 0.310 0.463 0 1
　Elapsed days after disclosure 161.400 239.370 0 800 120.000 222.884 0 798
　Number of floors 2.475 1.090 1 10 5.938 3.520 1 12
　Located floor 2.000 0.934 1 9 3.254 2.773 1 10
　Occupied area 25.090 4.868 11 39.750 101.570 58.033 19.15 311.970
　Age of building 13.170 8.991 0 69 28.170 5.827 9 48
　Rental apart dummy 0.796 0.403 0 1
　Rental town house dummy
　Rental mansion dummy 0.204 0.403 0 1
　Structure ALC dummy 0.003 0.053 0 1
　Structure PC dummy
　Structure RC dummy 0.121 0.326 0 1 0.156 0.363 0 1
　Structure SRC dummy 0.402 0.491 0 1
　Structure block dummy
　Structure light steel dummy 0.158 0.364 0 1
　Structure steel dummy 0.191 0.393 0 1 0.318 0.466 0 1
　Structure wooden dummy 0.527 0.499 0 1 0.124 0.330 0 1
　N 532
Single-person apartment Rental shop and office
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
7752
NA
NA
NA
NA
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Appendix B. Results Using All Apartments (Deviation Value) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Deviation value .0015*** .0014***
(.0001) (.0001)
After-disclosure dummy -.0275*** -.0470*** -.0037 -.0041 .0063
(.0080) (.0106) (.0097) (.0095) (.0100)
Deviation value × After-disclosure dummy .0008*** .0008*** .0001 .0001 -.0001
(.0002) (.0002) (.0001) (.0001) (.0002)
House characteristics
　Mansion dummy .0228*** .0234*** .0327*** .0322*** .0315***
(.0032) (.0032) (.0033) (.0033) (.0033)
　Number of floors .0141*** .0138*** .0078*** .0083*** .0083***
(.0016) (.0016) (.0020) (.0020) (.0020)
　Located floor .0022 .0022 .0017 .0018 .0017
(.0012) (.0012) (.0011) (.0011) (.0011)
　Structure ALC dummy -.1408*** -.1347*** -.1363*** -.1364*** -.1380***
(.0196) (.0191) (.0213) (.0213) (.0216)
　Structure PC dummy .1089*** .1079*** .1149*** .1148*** .1153***
(.0091) (.0101) (.0064) (.0065) (.0065)
　Structure RC dummy .0136** .0145** .0072* .0070 .0073
(.0045) (.0045) (.0043) (.0043) (.0043)
　Structure SRC dummy -.1125*** -.1121*** .0274*** .0273 .0173
(.0169) (.0164) (.0128) (.0130) (.0132)
　Structure light steel dummy .0402*** .0416*** .0342*** .0345*** .0350***
(.0024) (.0024) (.0028) (.0028) (.0028)
　Structure steel dummy -.0111*** -.0107*** -.0137*** -.0139*** -.0137***
(.0023) (.0023) (.0025) (.0025) (.0025)
　Occupied area .0208*** .0208*** .0238*** .0237*** .0238***
(.0005) (.0005) (.0005) (.0005) (.0005)
　Occupied area squared -.0001*** -.0001*** -.0001*** -.0001*** -.0001***
(.0000) (.0000) (.0000) (.0000) (.0000)
　Age of building -.0121*** -.0121*** -.0119*** -.0120*** -.0121***
(.0004) (.0004) (.0004) (.0004) (.0004)
　Natural log of age of building .0347*** .0354*** .0362*** .0369*** .0380***
(.0041) (.0042) (.0044) (.0044) (.0044)
Area characteristics
　Number of households .0003*** .0003*** -.0004*** -.0003*** -.0003***
(.0000) (.0000) (.0001) (.0001) (.0001)
　Population -.0002*** -.0002*** .0001* .0001* .0001
(.0000) (.0000) (.0000) (.0000) (.0000)
　Average household size .0216*** .0228*** -.0691** -.0620** -.0546*
(.0060) (.0061) (.0216) (.0219) (.0214)
　Number of children .0004*** .0004*** -.0001 -.0001 -.0001
(.0000) (.0000) (.0000) (.0000) (.0001)
　Number of elementary students -.0001*** -.0001*** -.0001*** -.0001*** -.0001***
(.0000) (.0000) (.0000) (.0000) (.0000)
　Average age .0025*** .0026*** -.0063*** -.0061*** -.0059***
(.0003) (.0003) (.0016) (.0016) (.0016)
　Number of samples (family) .0003* .0003** -.0004* -.0004* -.0005**
(.0001) (.0001) (.0002) (.0002) (.0002)
　Number of samples (single) .0005*** .0008*** -.0001 -.0001 -.0001
(.0001) (.0001) (.0002) (.0002) (.0002)
　Urban dummy .0633*** .0628***
(.0047) (.0047)
　North dummy -.0318*** -.0304***
(.0027) (.0027)
Control variables
　Time fixed effects YES YES YES YES
　Area fixed effects YES YES YES
　Urban/suburban trends YES YES
　North/south trends YES
N 15357 15338 15228 15209 15190
Adjusted R2 0.7993 0.8003 0.8527 0.8529 0.8532
※*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 5%, 1%, and 0.1%, respectively.
※Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the area level.
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Appendix C. Results Using All Apartments (School Rank) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
School rank -.0021*** -.0021***
(.0002) (.0002)
After-disclosure dummy .0322*** .0110 .0045 .0044 .0014
(.0033) (.0077) (.0067) (.0067) (.0067)
School rank × After-disclosure dummy -.0015*** -.0014*** -.0003 -.0003 -.0001
(.0002) (.0002) (.0002) (.0002) (.0002)
House characteristics
　Mansion dummy .0217*** .0223*** .0328*** .0322*** .0316***
(.0032) (.0032) (.0033) (.0033) (.0033)
　Number of floors .0141*** .0139*** .0078*** .0083*** .0084***
(.0016) (.0016) (.0020) (.0020) (.0020)
　Located floor .0023 .0023 .0017 .0018 .0017
(.0012) (.0012) (.0011) (.0011) (.0011)
　Structure ALC dummy -.1419*** -.1357*** -.1362*** -.1363*** -.1375***
(.0198) (.0193) (.0213) (.0212) (.0216)
　Structure PC dummy .1098*** .1088*** .1150*** .1149*** .1153***
(.0092) (.0102) (.0065) (.0065) (.0065)
　Structure RC dummy .0155** .0165** .0072 .0070 .0073
(.0046) (.0045) (.0043) (.0043) (.0043)
　Structure SRC dummy -.1111*** -.1106*** .0270* .0239 .0169
(.0170) (.0164) (.0128) (.0130) (.0131)
　Structure light steel dummy .0408*** .0421*** .0342*** .0346*** .0351***
(.0024) (.0024) (.0028) (.0028) (.0028)
　Structure steel dummy -.0099*** -.0095*** -.0137*** -.0139*** -.0137***
(.0023) (.0023) (.0025) (.0025) (.0025)
　Occupied area .0209*** .0208*** .0238*** .0237*** .0237***
(.0004) (.0004) (.0005) (.0005) (.0005)
　Occupied area squared -.0001*** -.0001*** -.0001*** -.0001*** -.0001***
(.0000) (.0000) (.0000) (.0000) (.0000)
　Age of building -.0121*** -.0122*** -.0120*** -.0120*** -.0121***
(.0004) (.0004) (.0004) (.0004) (.0004)
　Natural log of age of building .0342*** .0349*** .0363*** .0370*** .0380***
(.0041) (.0042) (.0044) (.0044) (.0044)
Area characteristics
　Number of households .0004*** .0004*** -.0003*** -.0003*** -.0003***
(.0000) (.0000) (.0001) (.0001) (.0001)
　Population -.0002*** -.0002*** .0001* .0001* .0001
(.0000) (.0000) (.0000) (.0000) (.0000)
　Average household size .0177** .0187** -.0712*** -.0640** -.0584**
(.0060) (.0061) (.0216) (.0218) (.0215)
　Number of children .0004*** .0004*** -.0001 -.0001 -.0001
(.0000) (.0000) (.0000) (.0000) (.0001)
　Number of elementary students -.0001*** -.0001*** -.0001*** -.0001*** -.0001***
(.0000) (.0000) (.0000) (.0000) (.0000)
　Average age .0023*** .0024*** -.0063*** -.0061*** -.0058***
(.0003) (.0003) (.0016) (.0016) (.0016)
　Number of samples (family) .0003** .0004** -.0004* -.0004* -.0005**
(.0001) (.0001) (.0002) (.0002) (.0002)
　Number of samples (single) .0005*** .0008*** -.0001 -.0000 -.0001
(.0001) (.0001) (.0002) (.0002) (.0002)
　Urban dummy .0659*** .0655***
(.0047) (.0047)
　North dummy -.0326*** -.0312***
(.0027) (.0027)
Control variables
　Time fixed effects YES YES YES YES
　Area fixed effects YES YES YES
　Urban/suburban trends YES YES
　North/south trends YES
N 15357 15338 15228 15209 15190
Adjusted R2 0.8002 0.8013 0.8528 0.8529 0.8532
※*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 5%, 1%, and 0.1%, respectively.
※Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the area level.
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Appendix D. Results Using Housing Rents per Square Meter 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Deviation value .0026*** .0026***
(.0001) (.0001)
After-disclosure dummy -.0717*** -.0647*** -.0279** -.0354*** -.0245**
(.0086) (.0105) (.0088) (.0093) (.0090)
Deviation value × After-disclosure dummy .0012*** .0012*** .0005*** .0007*** .0005**
(.0002) (.0002) (.0001) (.0002) (.0002)
Control variables
　House characteristics YES YES YES YES YES
　Area characteristics YES YES YES YES YES
　Time fixed effects YES YES YES YES
　Area fixed effects YES YES YES
　Urban/suburban trends YES YES
　North/south trends YES
N 7617 7598 7513 7494 7475
Adjusted R2 0.6556 0.6586 0.7700 0.7730 0.7742
(6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
School rank .-0033*** .-0033***
(.0002) (.0002)
After-disclosure dummy .0092* .0185* .0101 .0142* .0092
(.0039) (.0076) (.0059) (.0059) (.0059)
School rank × After-disclosure dummy -.0018*** -.0018*** -.0008*** -.0010*** -.0007***
(.0002) (.0002) (.0002) (.0002) (.0002)
Control variables
　House characteristics YES YES YES YES YES
　Area characteristics YES YES YES YES YES
　Time fixed effects YES YES YES YES
　Area fixed effects YES YES YES
　Urban/suburban trends YES YES
　North/south trends YES
N 7617 7598 7513 7494 7475
Adjusted R2 0.6539 0.6572 0.7701 0.7730 0.7742
※*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 5%, 1%, and 0.1%, respectively.
※Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the area level.
51 
 
Appendix E. Changes in Effect Over Time (Single-Person Apartments) 
 
Deviation value School rank
(1) (2)
Deviation value / School rank
　　　×2012 Q2 -.0010 .0017
(.0009) (.0011)
　　　×2012 Q3 .0000 .0006
(.0008) (.0010)
　　　×2012 Q4 .0005 -.0005
(.0007) (.0009)
　　　×2013 Q1 .0002 -.0003
(.0007) (.0009)
　　　×2013 Q2 -.0009 .0014
(.0007) (.0009)
　　　×2013 Q3 -.0019** .0029**
(.0007) (.0009)
　　　×2013 Q4 -.0013 .0018*
(.0007) (.0009)
　　　×2014 Q1 -.0010 .0014
(.0007) (.0009)
　　　×2014 Q2 -.0027*** .0035***
(.0007) (.0010)
　　　×2014 Q3 -.0023** .0031**
(.0008) (.0010)
　　　×2014 Q4 (disclosure) -.0032*** .0040***
(.0007) (.0009)
　　　×2015 Q1 -.0021** .0026**
(.0007) (.0010)
　　　×2015 Q2 -.0021** .0026**
(.0007) (.0010)
　　　×2015 Q3 -.0018** .0021*
(.0007) (.0009)
　　　×2015 Q4 -.0023** .0029**
(.0008) (.0010)
　　　×2016 Q1 -.0012 .0016
(.0007) (.0010)
　　　×2016 Q2 -.0005 .0007
(.0007) (.0009)
　　　×2016 Q3 -.0007 .0010
(.0008) (.0010)
　　　×2016 Q4 -.0017* .0022*
(.0007) (.0010)
N 7588 7588
Adjusted R2 0.7568 0.7561
※*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 5%, 1%, and 0.1%, respectively.
※Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the area level.
※All control variables (house characteristics, area characteristics, year fixed effects,
   area fixed effects, urban/suburban trends, and north/south trends) were controlled.
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Appendix E - Column (1),  
Changes in the effect of deviation value on rents of single-person apartments 
 
 
Appendix E - Column (2),  
Changes in the effect of school rank on rents of single-person apartments  
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Appendix F. Sample Divided according to the Child Population Density in an Area 
 
  
over 100 over 300 over 500 under 100 under 300 under 500
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
After-disclosure dummy -.0261* -.0487*** -.0709*** -.0312 -.0054 -.0053
(.0101) (.0136) (.0162) (.0201) (.0136) (.0131)
Deviation value × After-disclosure dummy .0005** .0009*** .0013*** .0007 .0002 .0001
(.0002) (.0002) (.0003) (.0005) (.0003) (.0003)
Control variables
　House characteristics YES YES YES YES YES YES
　Area characteristics YES YES YES YES YES YES
　Time fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
　Area fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
　Urban/suburban trends YES YES YES YES YES YES
　North/south trends YES YES YES YES YES YES
N 6589 4374 1980 790 2999 5385
Adjusted R2 0.7649 0.7501 0.8858 0.8308 0.8254 0.7243
over 100 over 300 over 500 under 100 under 300 under 500
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
After-disclosure dummy .0084 .0163* .0202 .0131 .0100 .0014
(.0062) (.0079) (.0104) (.0174) (.0089) (.0079)
School rank × After-disclosure dummy -.0007*** -.0014*** -.0020*** -.0009 -.0003 -.0001
(.0002) (.0003) (.0004) (.0007) (.0004) (.0003)
Control variables
　House characteristics YES YES YES YES YES YES
　Area characteristics YES YES YES YES YES YES
　Time fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
　Area fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
　Urban/suburban trends YES YES YES YES YES YES
　North/south trends YES YES YES YES YES YES
N 6589 4374 1980 790 2999 5385
Adjusted R2 0.7650 0.7501 0.8860 0.8306 0.8254 0.7243
※*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 5%, 1%, and 0.1%, respectively.
※Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the area level.
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Appendix G. Changes in Effect Over Time (Number of Samples, Single-Person)  
 
Deviation value School rank
(1) (2)
Deviation value / School rank
　　　×2012 Q2 .0031 -.0029
(.0077) (.0100)
　　　×2012 Q3 .0064 -.0045
(.0077) (.0100)
　　　×2012 Q4 .0181* -.0110
(.0089) (.0114)
　　　×2013 Q1 .0313*** -.0312**
(.0093) (.0114)
　　　×2013 Q2 .0302** -.0291*
(.0092) (.0120)
　　　×2013 Q3 .0332*** -.0370**
(.0088) (.0122)
　　　×2013 Q4 .0122 -.0092
(.0090) (.0130)
　　　×2014 Q1 -.0007 .0083
(.0083) (.0114)
　　　×2014 Q2 -.0054 .0125
(.0084) (.0115)
　　　×2014 Q3 -.0041 .0171
(.0079) (.0104)
　　　×2014 Q4 (disclosure) -.0008 .0064
(.0071) (.0096)
　　　×2015 Q1 .0019 .0048
(.0079) (.0102)
　　　×2015 Q2 .0148 -.0088
(.0097) (.0134)
　　　×2015 Q3 .0177* -.0150
(.0088) (.0121)
　　　×2015 Q4 -.0034 .0118
(.0070) (.0093)
　　　×2016 Q1 .0021 .0072
(.0078) (.0105)
　　　×2016 Q2 .0034 .0036
(.0074) (.0101)
　　　×2016 Q3 .0054 .0031
(.0078) (.0106)
　　　×2016 Q4 .0099 -.0038
(.0078) (.0105)
N 6650 6650
Adjusted R2 0.6918 0.6913
※*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 5%, 1%, and 0.1%, respectively.
※Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the school district level.
※All control variables (time fixed effects, area fixed effects, urban/suburban trends, and
north/south trends) were controlled.
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Appendix G - Column (1),  
Changes in the effect of deviation value on the number of single-person properties 
 
 
Appendix G - Column (2),  
Changes in the effect of school rank on the number of single-person properties 
